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society. But the search for the truth must be limited in order to 
take into account other important values, among which human 
rights hold a central place. The quest for a fair balance between 
the effective fight against crime and respect for individual rights 
constantly remains in the center of heated discussion. However, 
there are two other factors that strongly influence the evidentiary 
rules, creating an environment where finding the truth becomes 
more complicated than ever before. The popularity of the disposition 
of cases out of trial and the impact of technology and science, both 
interrelated and focused on the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system, paradoxically make the quest for the truth easier and faster, 
but also more prone to errors. Moreover, the new technologies al-
lowing evidence gathering have become a vital threat to the right to 
privacy. Finding solutions to these challenges necessitates dialogue 
including various stakeholders and free of the penal populism that 
has recently dominated the legal discourse. 
Keywords: admissibility of evidence; rights of individual; plea-bar-
gaining; digital evidence; illegally obtained evidence.
resumo: As regras sobre admissibilidade de provas garantem a verificação 
exata dos fatos como uma condição para a aplicação correta do direito penal 
material e o funcionamento adequado do sistema de justiça criminal na 
sociedade. Mas a busca pela verdade deve ser limitada para ponderar outros 
valores importantes, entre os quais os direitos humanos têm importância 
central. A meta de equilíbrio justo entre a persecução efetiva do crime e o 
respeito aos direitos individuais permanece constantemente no centro de 
acaloradas discussões. No entanto, existem dois outros fatores que influen-
ciam fortemente as regras probatórias, gerando um cenário onde encontrar 
a verdade torna-se mais complicado do que nunca. A generalização da 
resolução de casos sem processo (barganha penal) e o impacto de tecnologia 
e ciência, ambas inter-relacionadas e dirigidas à eficiência do sistema de 
justiça criminal, paradoxalmente tornam a busca pela verdade mais fácil e 
rápida, mas também mais sujeita a erros. Além disso, as novas tecnologias 
que permitem a coleta de provas tornaram-se uma ameaça determinante 
ao direito à privacidade. Encontrar soluções para esses desafios exige um 
diálogo que inclua as várias partes interessadas e livre do populismo penal 
que recentemente dominou o debate jurídico.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: admissibilidade da prova; direitos individuais; barganha 
penal; prova digital; ilicitude probatória.
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“When Jesus of Nazareth, in the hearing before the Roman prefect, 
confessed to being a king, he said: ‘I was born and am come into this 
world to bear witness to the truth’. At which Pilate asked ‘What is 
truth?’ The sceptical Roman obviously expected no answer to this 
question, nor did Our Lord give any. For to be witness to the truth 
was not the essence of his mission as a Messianic king. He was born 
to bear witness to justice, that justice which he wished to realise 
in the Kingdom of God. And for this justice he died on the cross.
So behind Pilate’s question: What is truth? there rises from the 
blood of the crucified another and still weightier question, the 
eternal question of mankind: What is justice?”
Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?, Berkeley 1957, p. 1.
1.  thE truth-sEEking in criMinal procEss – bEtwEEn thE 
divErgEncE and thE convErgEncE of thE systEMs
Adequate fact-finding is frequently presented as the most 
fundamental principle of criminal process4. Yet, despite the perception 
of the truth as the essential element of the successful operation of the 
criminal justice system, lawyers keep posing the question whether the 
truth is the most important value of all that comes in play in criminal 
process and whether the truth should be sought by all possible means 
and at all costs. As observed by scholars in a consciously ridiculed way, 
commenting on what the US criminal trial has become in the eyes of the 
public after the OJ Simpson verdict, “we must bag, once and for all, the 
4 See for example WEIGEND, Thomas. Should We Search for the Truth, and 
Who Should Do it? North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commer-
cial Regulation, vol. XXXVI, pp. 389-415, 2011, p. 389 (in relation to Ger-
many and France); WALTOŚ Stanisław; HOFMAŃSKI Piotr. Proces karny. 
Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 220 (in relation to Poland); BORGERS 
Matthias J.; STEVENS Lonneke. The Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and 
a Choice of Remedies. In: THAMAN Stephen C. (ed.) Exclusionary Rules 
in Comparative Law. Springer: Dordrecht–Heidelberg–New York–London, 
2013, p. 183 (in relation to the Netherlands), BACHMAIER WINTER Lore-
na. Spain: The Constitutional Court’s Move from Categorical Exclusion to 
Limited Balancing. In: THAMAN Stephen C. (ed.), op.cit., p. 211 (in rela-
tion to Spain).
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outmoded notion that a trial is a somber ‘search for truth.’”5 And even if 
this is just an exaggeration, we should be searching for an answer to the 
question of whether the truth does lie in the center of criminal process 
and, if so, what are the limits of fact-finding and what other values should 
be considered under certain circumstances as more important than the 
pure and ultimate truth? 
The view that establishing the truth is the main principle of 
criminal process is well grounded in the civil law countries. The common 
law jurisdictions, however, are frequently perceived as placing either 
consensus or fair contest between the parties above the truth. Nonetheless, 
accurate fact-finding is also a cornerstone of the criminal justice system 
in common law tradition. That is confirmed by the law6, case law7 as well 
as by the legal scholarship8. The differences between the adopted models 
of criminal process in the two main legal families are a fact, but should 
be understood as a consequence of promoting alternative methods of 
searching and establishing facts of the case, rather than an expression 
of a distinct goal the criminal justice system should serve9. From that 
perspective the role of the parties in adversarial disputes and the scope 
5 BRADLEY Craig M.; HOFFMANN Joseph L. Public Perception, Justice and 
the “Search for the Truth” in Criminal Cases. Southern California Law Re-
view, vol. 69, pp. 1267-1302, 1996, p. 1268.
6 See Rule 102 of US Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that rules of 
evidence are designed to ascertain the truth and secure a just determination. 
English Criminal Procedure Rules state that the ultimate goal of criminal 
proceedings (Rule 1.1.) is acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty. 
Although the accurate fact-finding is not mentioned, it is obvious that it is 
necessary to apply ius puniendi correctly.
7 See examples from England and Wales, Canada and USA in: HO Hock Lai. A 
Philosophy of Evidence Law. Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 52.
8 See: ROBERTS Paul; ZUCKERMAN Adrian, Criminal Evidence, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2010, p. 19. 
9 SPENCER John R. Evidence. In: DELMAS-MARTY Mireille; SPENCER John R. 
European Criminal Procedures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
pp. 636-637, WEIGEND Thomas. Should We Search for the Truth, and Who 
Should Do it?, op.cit., p. 414, VANDERMEERSCH Damien, Droit continen-
tal vs. droit anglo-américain: quells enseignements pour le droit belge de la 
procédure pénale, Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie, 2001, pp. 467-531, p. 
513, ASHWORTH Andrew; REDMAYNE Mike. The Criminal Process. Oxford: 
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of a judge’s inquisitorial powers are tools of securing the most efficient 
and accurate fact-finding. As a result, the central role of the truth in 
criminal process, regardless of the legal family to which a legal system 
belongs, should not be questioned. 
The pursuit of the truth in the criminal context is quite formalized. 
A variety of provisions refer to gathering, preserving, processing and 
evaluating relevant evidence. Among them the rules regarding admissibility 
of evidence are uniquely important. They serve a gatekeeping function 
and as a result may have an adverse influence on establishing the truth. 
Not surprisingly, the rules on the admissibility of evidence differ between 
the common law and Continental system, which will be discussed in this 
volume by Hanna Kuczyńska10. While the common law system opts for 
excluding some relevant evidence based on technical rules before it is 
heard in the courtroom, preventing the trier of fact from acknowledging 
the inadmissible evidence, the Continental model allows much more to be 
presented during trial and aims at evaluating the evidence post factum11. 
This distinction is ordinarily explained by the influence that laymen 
jurors have on the evidentiary rules in the common law system which is 
lacking in the Continental model. No doubt that in such a legal regime 
the more precise and harsher rules on the admissibility of evidence had 
to be developed12. 
This leads to the identification of the origins of the evidentiary 
rules, which are as old as ancient criminal trials. Even though the evidence 
law has for a long time been in a position of a single unified subject in 
a common law system, while not as much in the Continental one, the 
evidentiary rules are not foreign to the latter either. Interestingly, it has 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 23, KREMENS Karolina. Dowody osobowe w 
międzynarodowym postępowaniu karnym. Toruń: TNOiK, 2010, p. 60.
10 KUCZYŃSKA Hanna. Mechanisms of elimination of undesired evidence 
from criminal trial.
11 RYAN Andrea. Towards a System of European Criminal Justice. The Problem 
of Admissibility of Evidence, New York: Routledge 2014, p. 241.
12 See the classic discussion on the origins of evidentiary rules in connection to 
jury trials in common law system by DAMAŠKA Mirjan. The jury and the law 
of evidence: real and imagined interconnections. Law, Probability and Risk, 
vol. 5, issue 3-4, pp. 255-265, 2006.
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been argued that the reason why the contemporary rules on admissibility 
of evidence in the Continental criminal process embrace “free proof” 
is “an emphatic rejection of formalistic Roman-canon classification of 
evidence types and mechanistic qualifications of probative value”13. 
Illustrating that, Jerzy Skorupka takes us in this volume for a journey 
throughout the rules on admissibility of evidence of the Roman Empire, 
Ancient Greece and Teutonic tribes14. This analysis shows that the formal 
rules on evidence have also developed in the inquisitorial model and only 
incidental historical events have detached Continental Europe from the 
original inflexibility of rigid normative evidentiary rules.
It seems however that the era of differences is coming to an end. 
The evidence law currently faces unprecedented convergence. Although 
the criminal procedure in no way can be described as unified, similar 
tendencies in distinct countries can be observed, such as the growth of 
penal populism that results in retreat from some fundamental values15. 
Major changes can also be observed in the context of the European 
Union, which works hard on adopting common rules in criminal matters 
among EU members. With such tools as principles of mutual trust and 
recognition in criminal matters16, the European Arrest Warrant and 
the European Investigation Order17, common evidentiary standards are 
fast approaching. One example of such emergence of EU law relating 
13 JACKSON John; ROBERTS Paul. Beyond Common Law Evidence: Reimagin-
ing and Reinvigorating, Evidence Law as Forensic Science. In: BROWN Dar-
ryl K., TURNER Jenia J.; WEISSER Bettina (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Process, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 788. 
14 SKORUPKA Jerzy. The rule of admissibility of evidence in the criminal pro-
cess of continental Europe.
15 HODGSON Jacqueline S. The Metamorphosis of Criminal Justice. A Compar-
ative Account, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 343.
16 See broadly on mutual recognition in MITSILEGAS Valsamis. EU Criminal 
Law. Oxford: Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009, pp. 115-127. See 
specifically on mutual admissibility of evidence in the context of telephone 
tapping and house search in KUSAK Martyna, Mutual admissibility of evi-
dence in criminal matters in the EU. A study of telephone tapping and house 
search, Antwerp: Maklu, 2016.
17 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 
April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters 
[2004] OJ L130/1 1.5.2014
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to the collection of location data will be discussed in this volume by 
Dominika Czerniak18. But even outside of this peculiar European legal 
regime, a tendency to reimagine traditional evidentiary processes can 
also be identified through the proliferation of international criminal 
courts and tribunals. The direction in which the international criminal 
justice system developed in that regard is analyzed in this volume by 
Bartłomiej Krzan19. Whether the international criminal law may be 
named sui generis or is just an amalgam of two traditionally identified 
systems of criminal process may still be disputed20. Yet, it is certain that 
it adds in an important way to the merger of evidentiary practices by 
giving a stage to reexamine the strengths and weaknesses of different 
procedural and evidentiary mechanisms21. 
Therefore, regardless of the legal system prevailing in a given 
state, in the light of evidentiary rules gradually approaching one another, 
and acknowledging that adversarial and inquisitorial systems reflect two 
distinct yet equally valid approaches toward the search for the truth, 
we may now turn to as fundamental a question as what may limit the 
truth-seeking process. Accordingly, when limitations on fact-finding are 
considered, the discussion may be narrowed down to one significant 
18 CZERNIAK Dominika. Collection of location data in criminal proceed-
ings –European (the EU and Strasbourg) standards.
19 KRZAN Bartłomiej. Admissibility of evidence and international criminal justice.
20 See for example AMBOS Kai. International Criminal Procedure: “Adversari-
al”, “Inquisitorial” or “Mixed”? International Criminal Law Review, vol. 3, pp. 
1-37, 2003; KEEN Peter Carmichael. Tempered Adversariality: The Judicial 
Role and Trial Theory in the International Criminal Tribunals. Leiden Jour-
nal of International Law, vol. 17, pp. 767-814, 2004 and MUNDIS Daryl A., 
From ‘Common Law’ Towards ‘Civil Law’: The Evolution of the ICTY Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 14, pp. 
367-382, 2001.
21 See JACKSON John, ROBERTS Paul. Beyond Common Law Evidence: Re-
imagining and Reinvigorating, Evidence Law as Forensic Science, op.cit., p. 
815 and literature quoted there, in particular the analysis of a normative in-
tegration of criminal procedure described as a “hybridization” by DELMAS_
MARTY Mireille. Reflections on the “Hybridisation” of Criminal Procedure. 
In: JACKSON John, LANGER Máximo, TILLERS Peter (eds.). Crime, Proce-
dure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context. Essays in 
honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2008, pp. 251-260.
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problem – what evidence should be admissible as a basis of a criminal 
judgment? Generally, all evidence that is relevant and reliable should be 
preliminarily considered as admissible in criminal proceedings. Therefore, 
the rules on the admissibility of evidence may be perceived as always 
serving an aim to protect certain values that are challenged against the 
truth. This will be further explored in this volume by Giulio Ubertis22 
and Paolo Ferrua23.
Three important and timely factors causing serious implications 
for fact-finding at trial can be identified. The first one relates to the 
pressing need for the efficient processing of criminal cases. Although that 
phenomenon is more often discussed from the perspective of shortcomings 
that adversely affect procedural fairness, the evidentiary issues seem to 
be equally important. The second concerns the long-discussed human 
rights perspective that must be taken into account when the evidence 
obtained against such rights is considered to be admitted at trial. This 
in particular applies to the rights of the defendant, such as the right to 
remain silent or the right to examine or have examined witnesses, and 
is essential if the standard of the due process (fair trial) is to be met. 
Finally, the digital revolution also has an impact on criminal evidence and 
has started to play a particularly important role in the discussion on the 
admissibility of evidence. These challenges will now be discussed in turn. 
2.  thE adMissibility of EvidEncE and out-of-trial casE 
disposal
The most recent and crucial factors limiting the pursuit of 
truth relate to the necessity to guarantee the efficiency of criminal 
proceedings. Virtually all countries are faced with this challenge, 
due to the enormous overload of criminal cases24. Broadly accepted 
22 UBERTIS Giulio – I criteri di ammissibilita probatoria.
23 FERRUA Paolo - Ammissibilità della prova e divieti probatori 
24 See comparatively on ways in which states try to ensure the efficiency of 
criminal proceedings in JEHLE Jörg-Martin, WADE Marianne. Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems. The Rise of Prosecutorial Power 
in Europe, Berlin: Springer 2006 and more recently the analysis covering 
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negotiated agreements based on plea bargaining or other instruments 
made available to prosecutors allowing for disposition of cases outside 
of trial inevitably lead to ambiguous determination of the factual basis 
of decisions concerning the criminal liability of the defendant. While 
the judgment frequently relies on the evidence already considered as 
admissible by the prosecutor, the court’s responsibility for admitting 
the evidence becomes limited. This changes the dynamics between the 
actors of criminal process and reinforces the position of the prosecutor, 
weakening the judicial influence on the outcome of criminal proceedings25. 
In theory, this may seem uncontroversial, since the negotiated procedures 
assume that the accused when pleading guilty adheres to evidence on 
which the prosecutor relies to proves defendant’s guilt. However, when 
attention is paid to the details the question of authority playing a major 
role in the decision-making process regarding admissibility of evidence 
becomes more complicated. Such issues as the access of the defendant to 
evidence gathered during the investigation by criminal justice agencies 
and the exclusion of such evidence if necessary seems to be crucial 
in providing the defendant with the desired fairness of proceedings. 
Moreover, the advantages of various procedures allowing a full trial to 
be avoided may play an important role for the prosecutors and judges. 
Their ability to drastically reduce the caseload and smoothly close cases 
may negatively affect the willingness to question the facts established by 
the investigating authorities and accepted through the guilty plea. That 
may be the case even if there are potential lacunas in the case materials 
that would most probably have been raised and debated during trial. 
Certainly, the law may offer safeguards assuring that when the facts are 
disputed the case should be decided during an adversarial trial. Moreover, 
the fairness of proceedings may be guaranteed by demanding that the 
guilty plea be informed and voluntary. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of 
such provisions may be questioned when a defendant pleads guilty on 
impressive variety of countries by LANGER Máximo. Plea-bargaining, Con-
viction Without Trial and the Global Administratization of Criminal Convic-
tions, Annual Review of Criminology, 2021, vol. 4, pp. 377-411.
25 See on the redefinition of the position of the prosecutor during criminal pro-
cess in: KREMENS Karolina. Powers of the Prosecutor in Criminal Investiga-
tion. A Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2021 (forthcoming). 
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the basis of case materials containing evidence that should be excluded. 
An important role in that regard may be played by the defense counsel 
raising doubts toward the legality of obtained evidence. In this volume 
Thomas Weigend will seek an answer to these questions, arguing that 
rules on the exclusion of evidence should accordingly apply at an early 
stage of the criminal process26. 
The avoidance of full trial raises doubts related to human rights 
issues. Convictions not preceded by full adversarial trial and based on 
limited evidence gathered in an inquisitorial manner by the investigating 
authorities, even if accepted by the defendant, are problematic. As a 
consequence, they may affect the integrity of criminal process, understood 
as a tool designed to do justice in the society. Similar dilemmas regarding the 
integrity of criminal process arise when not the quantity and reliability of 
evidence to support the conviction, as in the case of simplified procedures, 
but the legality or propriety of their acquisition is controversial. Today, 
it can no longer be convincingly claimed that “It matters not how you 
get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence.”27 If the 
allegations that the evidence were obtained improperly are raised they 
have to be addressed at trial.
3.  thE adMissibility of EvidEncE and iMpropErly obtainEd 
EvidEncE 
As indicated, the goal of establishing the truth is not absolute 
and the criminal process does not function in a vacuum. Those who 
are suspects, defendants, victims or witnesses are also involved in a 
multitude of personal and professional relations that entail certain rights 
and duties. The rules of criminal procedure cannot be construed and 
applied without acknowledging that basic fact. In consequence, various 
values external to criminal process influence their shape and functioning. 
Some of them, like human dignity, acknowledged as a fundamental and 
26 WEIGEND Thomas. Exclusion without trial? Exclusion of evidence and ab-
breviated procedures.
27 Per Crompton J in R. v. Leatham (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 at 501.
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universal principle28, have influenced the fact-finding process in the 
criminal context for at least a few centuries. The prohibition of torture and 
the privilege against self-incrimination, as basic principles safeguarding 
human dignity, are perhaps the best examples limiting the powers of 
investigating authorities29. 
The last centuries, however, are marked with an even more visible 
tendency to limit the investigative powers of criminal justice agencies 
involved in the fact-finding process. Establishment of the exclusionary 
rule in the USA and its development prove that the observance of human 
rights (guaranteed in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments) became 
a crucial factor limiting the pursuit of truth in criminal proceedings. 
Certainly, this tendency is not exclusive to the USA, although it is true 
that in that system the exclusion of evidence has been developed in 
the broadest way. Similar developments can also be observed in other 
countries30. In this volume Frank Verbruggen and Charlotte Conings 
with regard to Belgian law31 and Pasquale Bronzo and Guido Colaiacovo 
concerning the Italian system32 analyze national approaches toward the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 
Apart from changes in domestic legal systems, the European 
standard regarding the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)33 was also developed 
28 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that all hu-
man beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
29 In the common law tradition, the origins of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination are traced back as early as 1568 (CHOO Andrew L-T. The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination and Criminal Justice. Oxford-Portland: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p. 2). On the prohibition of torture as a well-estab-
lished principle in English common law see: A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71.
30 See for example THAMAN Stephen (ed.) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative 
Law, op.cit., Springer: Dordrecht–Heidelberg–New York–London 2013.
31 VERBRUGGEN Frank, CONINGS Charlotte. After Zigzagging Between Ex-
tremes, Finally Common Sense? Will Belgium Return to Reasonable Rules on 
Illegally Obtained Evidence?
32 BRONZO Pasquale, COLAIACOVO Guido. Delitto di tortura e inutilizzabilità 
delle prove nel sistema processuale italiano.
33 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950, came into force in 1953.
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in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). And 
even though the Strasbourg Court is generally reluctant to intervene 
in the evaluation of evidence before national courts34, it nonetheless 
recognizes the relation between safeguarding rights of the parties to the 
proceedings and excluding improperly obtained evidence. Moreover, 
the judges perceive that relation in certain areas as strong enough to 
establish absolute exclusionary rules. For example, the ECtHR held 
that the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, real evidence obtained directly by 
torture, as well as evidence obtained by police incitement renders the 
trial unfair in terms of Article 6 ECHR35. More recently the scope of 
the exclusionary rule has been extended to cover statements admitted 
at trial obtained by torture administered by private individuals36, which 
will be further explored in this volume by Małgorzata Wąsek-Wiaderek 
37. The ECtHR also developed a more nuanced approach to exclude 
evidence gathered in violation of the right to privacy38, the right to 
access to a lawyer39 as well as real (non-testimonial) evidence obtained 
by inhuman or degrading treatment40 and fruit of the poisonous tree 
of violations of inhuman or degrading treatment prohibition41. It is 
adopted that in such contexts, the exclusionary rule is not working 
automatically. The admission of evidence should therefore be assessed 
taking into consideration the totality of circumstances of the case and 
that the holistic approach determines the evaluation of the fairness of 
the proceedings. 
Not surprisingly, the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
violation of human rights raises numerous controversies. The first 
34 Cf. for example Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, 11 July 2006, § 95.
35 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, 1 June 2010, § 166-167.
36 Ćwik v. Poland, no. 31454/10, 5 November 2020.
37 WĄSEK-WIADEREK Małgorzata. Admissibility of Statements Obtained as a 
Result of “Private Torture” or “Private” Inhuman Treatment as Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Emergence of a New European Standard?
38 Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378/02, 10 March 2009.
39 Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, 9 November 2018.
40 Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, 11 July 2006.
41 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, 1 June 2010.
27https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i1.537 |
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 15-42, jan.-abr. 2021. 
concerns whether the respect for human rights (the so-called protective 
principle42) is in fact a convincing rationale for the exclusion. Although 
the intuitive answer might seem positive, the existence of alternative 
justifications such as deterrence and integrity principles43 proves that 
human rights do not act as trump in deciding on the admissibility of 
evidence. Moreover, the historical development of the exclusionary 
rule in the USA indicates that the original justification for the exclusion 
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, namely 
protection of rights of the individual, was replaced by understanding 
the exclusionary rule as an instrumental device designed to deter 
police misconduct44. Even though the rationale based on human rights 
protection is questioned and sometimes abandoned in favor of other 
rationale, the deterrence principle and integrity principle implicitly 
accept the argument that respect for rights of the individual should 
at least to some extent be taken under consideration while gathering 
evidence to establish the truth in criminal proceedings. Recourse 
to the moral integrity of the criminal justice system, which is based 
on the fundamental right to a fair trial, as well as to the principle of 
deterrence, which aims at safeguarding the dignity and liberty of 
individuals and protecting the rule of law, implicitly confirms that 
while gathering evidence the rights of people subjected to investigative 
actions cannot be ignored. 
42 Term used in ASHWORTH Andrew. Excluding Evidence as Protecting 
Rights. Criminal Law Review, vol. 3, pp. 723-735, 1977.
43 See for example CHAU Peter. Excluding Integrity? Revisiting Non-Conse-
quentialist Justifications for Excluding Improperly Obtained Evidence in 
Criminal Trials. In: ROBERTS Paul, HUNTER Jill, YOUNG Simon NM., DIX-
ON David (eds.). The Integrity of Criminal Process. From Theory into Prac-
tice, Oxford–Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 279, ASHWORTH Andrew. 
Exploring the integrity principle in evidence and procedure In: MIRFIELD 
Paul, SMITH Roger. Essays for Colin Tapper, Oxford–New York: Lexis-Nex-
is, 2003, pp. 107-125, TURNER Jenia Iontcheva, WEIGEND Thomas. The 
Purposes and Functions of Exclusionary Rules: A Comparative Overview In: 
GLESS Sabine, RICHTER Thomas (eds.). Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a 
Fair Trial? A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules. Cham: Springer, 
2019, pp. 255-263.
44 MACLIN Tracey. The Supreme Court and Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary 
Rule. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 348-349.
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The emphasis makes, nonetheless, a substantive difference. 
While the protective principle is focused primarily on the rights of the 
individual, the other justifications imply a more complex weighing of 
competing interests. A good illustration of the latter are exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule created in case law. In a landmark judgment 
United States v. Leon45 establishing the “good faith” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that if the police officer executing a search warrant acted in good faith 
and within its scope, the evidence gathered should not be excluded 
even if the warrant ultimately was found to be invalid. As a result, 
narrowing the scope of the exclusionary rule proves that the violation 
of the individual’s rights is not sufficient to suppress evidence. A similar 
approach can be observed in the case law of the ECtHR. In Al-Khawaja 
and Tahery vs. United Kingdom it was decided that the right to a fair 
trial is a complex concept encompassing, apart from the rights of the 
defense, also the interests of the public and the victims of crime as well 
as, where necessary, the rights of the witnesses46. Therefore, it should be 
no surprise that limitations to the exclusion of evidence based on human 
rights arguments started to proliferate among various jurisdictions after 
the initial protective approach47. 
Moreover, the tension between safeguarding accurate fact-finding 
and imposing limitations on that process related to considerations of 
external values is clearly visible in different approaches to the exclusion 
of material (real) evidence and testimonial evidence. The ECtHR case law 
regarding real and testimonial evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR may serve as a good example. While the Strasbourg Court 
is firm in stating that admission at trial before the domestic court of 
45 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
46 Al-Khawaja and Tahery vs. United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 
23 May 2006, § 118. 
47 In that context it is worth mentioning the example of Spain, where the ex-
clusionary rule referring both to direct and indirect evidence (Article 11(1) 
Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial) is interpreted by the 
judicial authorities as having exceptions in cases of fruit of the poisonous 
tree. See: BACHMAIER WINTER Lorena. Spain: The Constitutional Court’s 
Move from Categorical Exclusion to Limited Balancing, op.cit., pp. 215-217. 
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depositions obtained by torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
violates the right to a fair trial, the same standard is not applied in 
respect of real evidence obtained by inhuman or degrading treatment48. 
Moreover, the ECtHR adopts a very inclusive attitude toward real evidence 
obtained by violation of the right to privacy49. Although it was not 
articulated explicitly by the Court, the reason for an adoption of the dual 
standard seems to be related to a distinct assessment of the reliability of 
material and testimonial evidence. The implicit emphasis on reliability 
of evidence as a crucial factor in deciding on its admissibility can be 
noticed in many jurisdictions in an inclusive approach to admitting 
real evidence obtained during a search conducted in violation of a right 
to privacy50. Naturally, it may be a matter of dispute how respect for 
human rights or the pursuit of truth should be weighed. However, even 
if the inclusive trend in admissibility decisions related to improperly 
obtained evidence is visible in many jurisdictions, no one advocates 
that violations of human rights should be disregarded. Rather they are 
treated as one of the factors that should be assessed, with an emphasis 
on the seriousness and intentionality of violation51. These arguments 
relating to the optimum scope of the exclusion of reliable evidence and 
limitation of search for the truth are becoming equally important in the 
context of the most challenging revolution concerning evidence law – 
the era of digital evidence.
48 Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, 11 July 2006.
49 See for example Bykov v. Russia, no. 4378/02, 10 March 2009 and the criti-
cism of that approach in dissenting opinions.
50 It is visible in at least questionable distinction between legality of search it-
self and seizure of evidence revealed by search stemming from case law of 
German and Italian courts (THAMAN Stephen C. Balancing Truth Against 
Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary Rules [w:] Exclusionary 
Rules in Comparative Law, In: THAMAN Stephen C. (ed.) Exclusionary 
Rules in Comparative Law, op.cit., p. 434; RUGGIERI Francesca; MARCOLI-
NI Stefano. Italy. In: LIGETI Katalin (ed.). Toward a Prosecution for the Eu-
ropean Union, Volume 1. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford–Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2013, p. 396).
51 See WEIGEND Thomas. Germany. In: LIGETI Katalin (ed.). Toward a Pros-
ecution for the European Union, Volume 1. A Comparative Analysis, op.cit., 
p. 296.
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4.  thE adMissibility of EvidEncE and thE tEchnological 
dEvElopMEnts 
The expansion of new technologies experienced during the past 
forty years certainly has not left the criminal justice system untouched. 
Without exaggeration this process can be called one of the greatest 
challenges that the criminal law and procedure has been faced with. And 
yet it is uncertain how influential this process might be in the future, 
as the creation of new technologically advanced devices and tools is 
speeding up. The self-driving cars tested in cities, the development of the 
5G network or the rising popularity of home assistants and smart TVs 
that were all unimaginable even a decade ago are just a few examples of 
a rapidly changing reality which does not leave the criminal law beyond 
its influence. 
Certainly, it is not a novel reflection that the growth of the impact 
of science on our lives is also influencing the criminal law52. This process 
is constantly observed through such mechanisms as electronic monitoring 
of convicts53 and the significant increase in the digitalization of court 
proceedings that allows for the conducting of proceedings through high-
quality video link. It is no longer impossible to imagine court hearings 
happening online, as this takes place every day in many national and 
international courts and started long before the social distancing 
requirements of COVID-1954. It would be, therefore, surprising if the 
digital revolution did not influence the engagement of criminal evidence 
in the fact-finding process. 
52 See very recently CAIANELLO Michele. Criminal Process faced with the 
Challenges of Scientific and Technological Development, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2019, vol. 27, pp. 265-289.
53 See NELLIS Mike, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders in England and 
Wales: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, The British Journal of 
Criminology, vol. 31 (2), 1991, pp. 165-185 and more recently NELLIS Mike, 
Understanding the Electronic Monitoring of Offenders in Europe: Expan-
sion, Regulation and Prospects, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 62, 2014, 
pp. 489-510.
54 See one example of the pre-covid era in online hearings by MENASHE Doron, 
A Critical Analysis of the Online Court, University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law, vol. 39 (4), 2018, pp. 921-953.
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Perhaps the earliest signs of it have been the use of scientific 
evidence and the expansion of forensic science leaving a significant mark 
on the evidentiary rules more than a hundred years ago. The discussion 
over the reliability of scientific evidence that swept through the US 
system55 are just one of many examples of how the rules on admissibility 
of evidence demand a distinct approach when scientific knowledge 
that is hard to grasp and control becomes a part of evidence-taking. 
This is definitely not yet a completed chapter and the cases of wrongful 
convictions based on pseudoscience or resulting from the lack of proper 
testing of biological samples are just the tip of the iceberg56. The wrongful 
convictions are also frequently caused by the improper identification. In 
this volume Janaina Matida and William Weber Cecconello discuss that 
issue in the context of identification by eyewitness through photographs57. 
Some other contemporary problems of exclusion of scientific expert 
evidence from the Continental perspective are also discussed in this 
volume by Juan Sebastian Vera Sanchez58.
However, the technological development has also already left its 
mark on the gathering of criminal evidence. For one, the police and other 
agencies have gained immediate access to various databases from the level 
of the police car which allows them to verify the identity of a stopped 
car or a person on the spot59. Quicker access to data has facilitated the 
55 See the landmark cases Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See 
also critically on the Frye-Daubert standard by HILBERT Jim. The Disap-
pointing History of Science in the Courtroom: Frye, Daubert, and the Ongo-
ing Crisis of “Junk Science” in Criminal Trials. Oklahoma Law Review, vol. 71, 
2019, pp. 759-821.
56 See also an interesting piece on the perceptible need for a change of the law of 
evidence in the common law system faced with the use of forensic science by 
JACKSON John; ROBERTS Paul. Beyond Common Law Evidence: Reimagining 
and Reinvigorating, Evidence Law as Forensic Science, op.cit., pp. 787-820.
57 MATIDA Janaina and CECCONELLO William Weber. Reconhecimento fo-
tográfico e presunção de inocência.
58 VERA SANCHEZ Juan Sebastian. Exclusión de la prueba pericial científica 
(de baja calidad epistémica) en fase de admisibilidad en procesos penales de 
tradición románica-continental. 
59 This is not limited to the most common databases such as for fugitives, sus-
pected criminals, fingerprints, DNA profiling etc. See an analysis on the role 
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actions of the police and led to more accurate verification of offenders 
or persons at large. Moreover, the drive toward recording daily activities 
of criminal justice agencies plays a crucial role in creating convincing 
evidence. Video recordings are available not only during interrogations 
conducted at the police station, but body-worn cameras are nowadays 
even placed onto officers’ uniforms providing on-site coverage of their 
interactions with the public, which makes them a remarkable argument 
in the courtroom60. The most recent novelty in that regard is the use of 
artificial intelligence as a tool for providing criminal evidence61. The use 
of these new tools brings another risk to the traditional approach toward 
the administration of justice blurring the boundaries between preventive 
and traditionally repressive criminal justice62. This can be observed for 
example in the US federal system, which has already widely employed 
algorithmic risk assessment tools in criminal sentencing processes63. 
Another example of challenges faced by criminal justice systems 
in the context of admissibility of evidence resulting directly from the 
development of new technologies is the issue of access obtained by 
of genetic genealogy databases in discovery of a crime by GUERRINI Christi 
J.; ROBINSON Jill O.; PETERSEN Devan, McGUIRE Amy L. Should police 
have access to genetic genealogy databases? Capturing the Golden State Kill-
er and other criminals using a controversial new forensic technique, PLOS 
Biology, 2 October 2018 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906.
60 See SOUSA William H., COLDREN James R.; RODRIGUEZ Denise Jr., 
BRAGA Anthony A. Research on Body Worn Cameras: Meeting the Chal-
lenges of Police Operations, Program Implementation, and Randomized 
Controlled Trial Designs, Police Quarterly, vol. 19 (3), 2016, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1098611116658595
61 GLESS Sabine. AI in the Courtroom: A Comparative Analysis of Machine Ev-
idence in Criminal Trials, Georgetown Journal of International Law vol. 51, 
2020, pp. 195-253.
62 CAIANELLO Michele. Criminal Process faced with the Challenges of Scien-
tific and Technological Development. European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 27, pp. 265-289, 2019, p. 279.
63 KEHL Danielle; GUO Priscilla; KESSLER Samuel. Algorithms in the Criminal 
Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing. 
Responsive Communities Initiative, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & 
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law enforcement agencies to data stored on electronic carriers, such 
as computers, cellphones, clouds, etc. This strongly interrelates to the 
discussion on exclusionary rules but sheds a new perspective on how the 
evidentiary rules should be drafted in this new context. The traditional 
rules on admissibility of evidence developed over centuries for the purpose 
of house searches and personal searches did not foresee the problems 
that come with the complexity of electronic devices storing gigabytes 
of highly personal data64. 
One striking illustration of that problem is the admissibility of 
evidence obtained from cellphones. Cellphones differ distinctly from 
any other object that may be found on a person. They are constantly 
accessible, portable, and may be used for multiple purposes, giving a space 
for social and emotional communication65. They are even considered such 
a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that, as one judge has stated, 
“the visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature 
of human anatomy.”66 Most importantly, modern smartphones contain 
highly private data that can only be compared to what is kept at home 
and certainly not to what is found in someone’s pocket or wallet.
Therefore, the key issue in this discussion concerns the limits 
of interference of criminal justice authorities with data contained on 
smartphones and whether the police should have similar powers to 
search such devices as they usually have for searching a person and 
their belongings at the time of arrest. So far this has been answered 
ambiguously both on a normative level67 as well as in the case law68. 
64 SACHAROFF Laurent. The Fourth Amendment Inventory as a Check on Dig-
ital Searches, Iowa Law Review vol. 105, pp. 1643-1699, 2020, p. 1645.
65 FOWLER Joanna E.N.; Noyes Janet M. From dialing to tapping: University 
students report on mobile phone use. Procedia Manufacturing, vol. 3, pp. 
4716-4723, 2015, p. 4717.
66 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), at 2484.
67 The attempts to regulate the issue of cellphone searches provide a variety of 
resolutions and there is no common ground achieved. See for example the 
Formobile project devoted to analysis on how the current criminal procedure 
laws in the EU Member States deal with the topic of mobile forensics https://
www.timelex.eu/en/horizon-projects/formobile (accessed 21.01.2021). 
68 See for example Hoge Raad Judgment of 4 April 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584 
available at https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL: 
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Particularly interesting in that regard has been the dialogue that took 
place in 2014 among North American courts taking different stances on 
that issue. One position was adopted by the US Supreme Court in a split 
judgment Riley v. California69. In a majority opinion the Court confirmed 
the uniqueness of the cellphone as an object and established that because 
of that feature the cellphone cannot be searched based on the same 
grounds as in the case of other objects found on a person70. The decision 
has clearly favored privacy interests with respect to all data contained in 
portable devices and recognized these interests as more valuable than 
the effectiveness of criminal investigation. The judgment has made the 
lives of criminal justice authorities just a bit harder by forcing them to 
obtain judicial search warrants prior to engaging in searching practices. 
Interestingly, almost at the same time the issue of cellphone searches was 
deliberated by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v. Fearon71. In the split 
decision the Court came up with exactly the reverse opinion, arguing 
that the cellphone search falls under the same old common law rule 
of searches incident to arrest without a warrant. The Court just added 
some additional safeguards as the cellphone search potentially brings a 
more significant invasion of privacy than the other similar searches.. The 
additional protection proposed by the court, focused on such technicalities 
HR:2017:584. (The Dutch court has presented the view that that if the search 
concerned a small amount of certain data stored or available on the electronic 
data carrier such as cellphone it may be that the search is justified. On the oth-
er hand, if the search is so far-reaching that a more or less complete picture is 
obtained of certain aspects of the personal life of the user of the data carrier or 
the computerized work, this investigation may be considered as unlawful.) See 
also a short note on the case in English https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/
dutch-police-can-search-smartphone/11769.
69 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
70 See comments on this judgment by George DERY III M., MEEHAN Kevin. 
A New Digital Divide? Considering the Implications of Riley v. California’s 
Warrant Mandate for Cell Phone Searches. University of Pennsylvania Jour-
nal of Law and Social Change vol. 18 (4), 2015, pp. 311-339 and comparing 
it with the Italian standard by LASAGNI Giulia, Tackling phone searches in 
Italy and the United States: Proposals for a technological rethinking of proce-
dural rights and freedoms, New Journal of European Criminal Law, vol. 9 (3), 
2018, pp. 386-401.
71 R v. Fearon 2014 SCC 77.
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as the taking of notes by the police officers while conducting the search, 
has been criticized both in concurring opinion and in literature72.
The concurring perspectives delivered in these judgments, which 
split even internally, prove that the case of the legality of cellphone 
searches demands more careful attention, as weighing the value of privacy 
interests against the law enforcement objectives in the digital era is all 
but self-evident. This seems to be extending analogically to other cases 
of technological developments touching on the sphere of evidence-
taking which through their novelty create multidimensional challenges 
to the criminal justice system. One thing however appears to be beyond 
question: these challenges call for immediate regulation as those who 
commit crimes make use of new devices and digital technology without 
any restraints. The states cannot be reluctant in providing legislation 
regulating such issues and wait for the courts to resolve the problems 
on a case-by-case basis. But how a balance is struck between the needs 
of society in successfully investigating crimes in a way that responds to 
criminals’ use of technology without violating the rights of an individual 
is the question that should be quickly answered. And this most likely 
cannot be answered in isolation by a single state, as the ease with which 
digital evidence crosses borders demands unified and collective action.
5. conclusions 
It is undisputed that relevant and reliable evidence should generally 
be admissible in criminal proceedings. Their admissibility secures accurate 
fact-finding as a prerequisite for the correct application of substantive 
criminal law and, as a consequence, proper operation of the criminal justice 
system in society. At the same time the search for the truth must be limited 
in order to take into account other important values, among which human 
rights hold a central place. A matter of dispute is however how the competing 
interests should be balanced. That results in significant differences in views 
on the optimum shape of provisions related to admissibility of evidence. 
72 See comments on this judgment by SKOLNIK Terry. Improving the Current 
Law of Warrantless Cellphone Searches after R v. Fearon, Revue Juridique 
Thémis de l’Université de Montréal, vol. 49, 2015, pp. 825-833.
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That divergence is understandable taking into consideration the competing 
approaches as well as the desired way of verifying admissibility of evidence. 
The latter, relating to the choice between a trial before professional judges 
or a jury, is of vital importance. Even though the identified variances are 
remarkable, the noticeable convergence trends may be identified as well. 
The drive toward effective international cooperation in criminal matters 
and the need for the universal protection of human rights are the main 
reasons forcing the approximation of provisions related to the admissibility 
of evidence. It seems the traditionally recognized distinction between the 
common law and civil law models is becoming less important in light of 
the progressive integration of systems. Certainly, that process is not linear 
and we should not expect that a common unified standard emerges soon. 
Yet, its influence on national laws of evidence should not be marginalized, 
of which the EU cooperation in criminal matters is just one of the most 
remarkable examples. 
The admissibility of evidence, apart from being subjected to 
divergent and convergent trends, also faces other important challenges. 
The first of them is the need for the protection of human rights. As in 
previous decades, the quest for a fair balance between the effective fight 
against crime and respect for individual rights will be in the center of heated 
discussion. However, there are two other factors that strongly influence the 
evidentiary rules, creating an environment where finding the truth becomes 
more complicated than ever before. The popularity of the disposition of 
cases out of trial and the impact of technology and science, both interrelated 
and focused on the efficiency of the criminal justice system, paradoxically 
make the quest for the truth easier and faster, but at the same time more 
prone to errors. Moreover, the new technologies allowing evidence gathering 
have become a vital threat to the right to privacy. 
Certainly, there is hope in what we experience. As Caianiello 
predicts, “the traditional bases of fact-finding at trial can endure even 
against these [scientific and technological] challenges.”73 He adds that 
it is possible only as far as lawyers and scholars will be able to approach 
the new available tools with a sufficient amount of criticism. This seems 
73 CAIANIELLO Michele. Criminal Process faced with the Challenges of Scien-
tific and Technological Development. op.cit., p. 265.
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to be crucial to face the challenges. None of them can be answered in a 
simple and universal way. Finding solutions necessitates dialogue including 
various stakeholders and free of the penal populism that has dominated 
the legal discourse in at least several countries. An important part of 
that discussion should be devoted to comparative analysis, which allows 
countries to share and profit from the experience of other legal systems. 
This issue of Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal aims at achieving 
that goal. And while closing this brief discussion let us give a floor to those 
who will provide an answer to some of the questions raised toward the 
modern challenges of admissibility of evidence in criminal procedure.
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